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INTRODUCTION

Some scholars have described Justice O'Connor's decision-making
as being in the tradition of Chief Justice Marshall, engaging in "reasoned elaboration of the law in light of its purposes and history, fidelity to precedent, and respect for consistent executive or legislative
practice." 2 Others describe it simply as balancing. 3 Whatever the label, Justice O'Connor's decision-making made her "the most powerful
woman in America." 4 Extensive studies have been done of her jurisprudence in the areas of women's rights, federalism, and separation of
church and state. 5 However, surprisingly little has been written about
her free speech jurisprudence. In the area of free speech, as with most
2. Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Sandra Day O'Connor: A Justice Who
Has Made a Difference in ConstitutionalLaw, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 915, 918-19
(2001). Professors Kelso and Kelso identify four styles of decision-making on the
Court today. Id. at 918. According to them, Justices Scalia and Thomas are classified
as formalists, Chief Justice Rehnquist exemplified the tradition of Justice Holmes,
Justice Kennedy follows Chief Justice Marshall along with Justice O'Connor, and finally Souter, Ginsberg and Stevens mainly use a style called instrumentalism. Id.
3. C. Lincoln Combs, Note, A Curious Choice: Hibbs v. Winn As a Case Study of

Justice SandraDay O'Connor'sBalancingJurisprudence,37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 192-93

(2005).
4. Fed. Bar Ass'n, Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme

Court, 48-SEP FED. LAW. 18, 18 (2001).
5. Molly McDonough, O'Connor: A Trailblazer Who Defies Labels, 4 No. 28

A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 1 (2005) (quoting Professor Douglas Kmiec of Pepperdine).
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constitutional law, she has shaped many of the tests used by the
Court.6
One of the first cases that Sandra Day O'Connor heard as a newly
appointed Supreme Court Justice was Widmar v. Vincent, arguably
one of the more important free speech forum cases.7 Voting in the
majority on Widmar, she began a journey during which she would author over fifty free speech opinions, including some of the most influential.8 If, as she tells us, context matters, then a look at Justice
O'Connor's rugged roots will reveal the foundation of the many
themes that move through her free speech jurisprudence, as indeed
through all of her decisions.
Part II looks at those roots from growing up on a ranch in the
southwest to being the first woman to sit on the Supreme Court of the
United States. Part III reviews the basic steps and tests the Court uses
in free speech cases. Part IV surveys Justice O'Connor's work in the
area of forum analysis. Parts V and VI examine the other variables in
the analysis: content-selectivity and government interest. Part VII
gives a broader look at her influence at the intersection of free speech
and other doctrines, such as intellectual property. Part VIII concludes
that Justice O'Connor's influence on free speech has been significant,
reflecting her background, and proving that context does indeed
matter.
II.

PuTTING SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR IN CONTEXT

In March of 1930, Ada Mae Day traveled to her mother's house in
El Paso to give birth to Sandra Day on March 26th.9 In mid-April,
mother and baby daughter returned home to the Lazy B ranch in an
unforgiving part of Arizona near the New Mexico and Mexico borders.1" In that harsh environment, young Sandra learned the values
and skills that would serve her in good stead both in life and in law.
Her family, the cowboys, and the ranch itself were her earliest teachers. 1 Some of these lessons would provide the underpinnings of her
jurisprudence: a love of history, practicality, and a strong sense of balance. Along with a keen intellect and a strong sense of humor, these
traits would shape Sandra Day and later her jurisprudence.
6.
7.
8.
speech
9.

Erwin Chemerinsky, The O'Connor Legacy, 41-SEP TRIAL 68, 68 (2005).
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
For more on her forum analyses, please see infra Part IV (looking at the free
tests as they have evolved during O'Connor's tenure).

SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR & H. ALAN DAY, LAZY B: GROWING UP ON A CATTLE RANCH IN THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 95 (2002).

10. Id.
11. See generally id. (dedicating chapters to each of her parents, several of the
cowboys, and the ranch itself).
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Living on the Lazy B and Going to School

"It was not until I grew up and moved away from the Lazy
B that
12
I learned just how unusual my early life was. "
Life on the Lazy B Ranch could not be called easy. The Day family
13
had no electricity or plumbing until Sandra was seven years old.
Water was scarce, and a broken windmill or pump was no laughing
matter.14 Life on the Lazy B took "planning, patience, skill, and endurance." 5 Justice O'Connor has since described the ranch as an island-a place of serene desolation.' 6 She speaks of the Lazy B as if it
were a person who shaped her character as she grew. 17 And yet, for
all that she paints a harsh picture of the Lazy B, the portrait seems to
be drawn by a respectful and loving hand. 8
As an only child for her first nine years, Sandra spent a great deal of
time out on the ranch with her father.' 9 Their relationship was especially strong.2 ° She watched as he checked on cattle, dug new wells,
fixed pumps on the old wells, and made sure everything kept running
with his own combination of intelligence and practicality. 2' When the
ranch finally got plumbing, he made a solar-powered water heater system before the device had been invented. 22 He worked hard and expected perfection. 23 Although he never went to college, he was wellread regarding world events. 24 Dinner time often turned into an enjoyable debate with his family about the world. 25 He always had to
have the last word-a trait O'Connor says she learned from him.2 6
The things she admired in her father were his practicality, industry,
intellectual curiosity, inventiveness, and warmth.2 7 She learned those
virtues from him too.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

111.
97.
7.
10.
317.
315.

18. See id. at 311 (describing the sorrow she experienced when the ranch was finally sold).
19. Id. at 29.
20. Id.

21. Id. at 28.
22. Id. at 97.
23. Id. at 23. O'Connor describes her father's reaction to her job repainting a
screen door. Id. at 33-34. She started over several times when he pointed out
problems with her methodology. Id. Although she got no effusive thanks from him,
she knew she had done well. Id.
24. Id. at 29.
25. Id.
26. Id.

27. See generally id. at 23-35 (describing her father and his personality).
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Her mother, MO, taught lessons of grace and poise under pressure. 21 "She made a hard life look easy."' 29 She also taught Sandra to

read at the age of four.30 MO had a great curiosity which she instilled
in Sandra at an early age. 31 An energetic woman, MO worked hard,
but managed to maintain her sense of style in the wilderness. 32 Generally polite, MO would occasionally speak out. 33 Once, when asked

how many head of cattle she had, she replied, "If you will tell me how
much money you have in your bank account, I will tell you how many
cows we have on the ranch. '34 MO certainly passed this quick wit on
to her daughter. Later in O'Connor's life, an angry committee chairman told her that if she were a man he would punch her in the
mouth.
She replied, "If you were a man, you could. 36
With the exception of one year, Sandra spent her school years with
her grandmother in El Paso-a four hour train ride away. 37 Her parents felt she would receive a better education in El Paso. 38 Although
her descriptions of school in El Paso reflect her love of learning, she
admits that she was horribly homesick the whole time.3 9 Sandra may
have learned a great deal in school, but without a doubt she learned
just as much living in the beautiful desolation of the Lazy B.
B.

Law School and Shortly Thereafter

"I guess I was naive-because when I entered 40
law school,
I didn't even think about the future. ,

Graduating high school at just sixteen, Sandra had her heart set on

going to Stanford.4 1 Her father wanted to go to Stanford too, but had
to give up his own dream to come home and run the Lazy B. 42 At
Stanford, Sandra majored in economics and, as part of that curriculum, had her first exposure to law. 43 Interest sparked, and she en28.
29.
30.
31.
rocks,
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 44.
Id. O'Connor recalls her mother taking them on walks and looking at plants,
and bugs for hours. Id.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
Id.
PETER

O'CONNOR

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
(2005)

HUBER,

AMERICAN

WOMEN

OF

ACHIEVEMENT:

SANDRA

DAY

40 (1990).

Id.

O'CONNOR & DAY, supra note 9, at 115.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 116-17.
Veronica Sainz, FrontierJustice, 25 BRIEFCASE: U. OF Hous. L. CENTER 10, 13
(describing a speech given by the Justice in Houston on March 10, 2005).
41. HUBER, supra note 35, at 28.
42. O'CONNOR & DAY, supra note 9.

43.

HUBER,

supra note 35, at 28.
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She did extremely well, becoming a

member of the Stanford Law Review.4 5 Law school was a man's
world then. Even so, she graduated third in her class from Stanfordher classmate and friend, William Rehnquist, graduated first in their
class.46 While cite checking materials for the law review, she met John
O'Connor.4 7 They began dating, and six months after she graduated,
they married.4"
Although she graduated with distinction, O'Connor had an extremely difficult time finding a job."9 Not only was law school a man's
world, but the legal field as a whole was dominated by men.5 ° She got
an interview with a law firm, but the only job offer she received was
for a position as a legal secretary. 5 Finally, she went to work for very
little pay for the San Mateo, California county attorney's office.52 She
would later say that job had greatly influenced her life because it introduced her to working in the public sector, about which she was
passionate for the rest of her legal career. 53 After John graduated
from Stanford they moved to Germany where he was posted by the
army.54 She had to pay for her own plane ticket because they were so
newly married.55 There she worked as a lawyer for the U.S. government in the Judge Advocate General's Corps. 6 When John was re57
leased from service, the O'Connors moved back to Arizona.
Even in the Wild West, Sandra could not find a job with a law
firm.58 So, showing the practicality instilled in her from her Lazy B
years, she started her own.59 The firm employed two attorneys total,
and they took every case that walked in the door.6" She stopped
working at the law office for a while to raise their three children, but
that did not slow her down.61 That period of her life can best be de44. Id. at 29.
45. Id. at 31.

33.

46. Id. at 32-33. John O'Connor started law school after Sandra Day did. Id. at
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 32.
Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 33.
See id.

51. Id. One has to wonder if the man who offered her the secretarial position
made the connection when O'Connor became the first woman on the Supreme Court.
And, if so, what his reaction was.
52. Sainz, supra note 40, at 13.
53. HUBER, supra note 35, at 33.
54. Id. at 35.
55. Sainz, supra note 40, at 13.
56. HUBER, supra note 35, at 35.
57. Id.

58. Sainz, supra note 40, at 13.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 14.
61. HUBER, supra note 35, at 37. She did stop work for several years. Although
she did not mind being at home with the children, she knew that she would go back to
law.
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scribed as industrious.62 Like her energetic mother before her,
O'Connor was never idle. She organized a lawyer-referral service,
volunteered for various organizations, served as both a bankruptcy
trustee and juvenile court referee, and participated in local and national Republican Party politics.6 3
C.

The Beginning of Life in the Public Eye

"I learned to try to get bipartisansupport for the things
I cared about.
I think you do that by making friends on both sides of the aisle."64
In 1966, the governor of Arizona appointed O'Connor to fill a state
senate seat that had fallen vacant. 65 Her colleagues described her as a
perfectionist, and in 1972 they rewarded her by selecting her as their
senate majority leader.6 6 O'Connor was the first female senate majority leader in any state.6 7 She worked tirelessly. 68 She later said,
[The] state legislatures are closest to the people and reflect their will
in the most direct manner . . . The independence of the states...
helps to protect69 one of our most cherished liberties: the right to govern ourselves.
Her understanding of local governments and her respect for their capabilities-or disappointment at their inabilities-is apparent
throughout all of her jurisprudence.
Eventually the law called to her again. She left politics, ran for
judge, and was elected in 1974.70 Lawyers who had been in her courtroom said she ran her court in a tough but merciful fashion, frequently
knowing the cases better than did the lawyers themselves. 7 1 Four
years later, the Arizona governor appointed her to a seat on the Arizona Court of Appeals. 72 Here she thought she was destined to stay
and was content with the idea.7 3
O'Connor spent eighteen months on the court before her life
changed dramatically." In July 1981, President Reagan requested a
meeting with her.75 She went to Washington and met the President,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id.
Id. All of this was done while raising three small sons.
Sainz, supra note 40, at 14.
HUBER, supra note 35, at 38.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 49.

SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE Xii (2003).
74. HUBER, supra note 35, at 50.

75. O'CONNOR, supra note 73.
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his staff, and advisors.76 Justice Powell later described for O'Connor
the surprise he felt when he was appointed to the Supreme Court as
rather like being hit by lightning.77 O'Connor describes her own sensation in her book, The Majesty of the Law:78
The metaphysical lightning bolt suddenly seemed as if it might head
in my direction, and I was about as astonished, though slightly less
frightened, as if I had seen a real bolt of lightning making its way
straight for me.79
After three days of hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, O'Connor was approved."0 A week later, the entire Senate approved her without a single dissenting vote.81
D. Showing Her Context
If people bring their context with them throughout their lives, then
the Lazy B went to Washington with Justice O'Connor. Her jurisprudence reflects the character that the Lazy B and the Wild West built in
her. She perceives everything, to a greater or lesser extent, through
the filter of her life there. She brings a sense of balance from her
early days on the ranch, where life was precarious and water was precious. Her father taught her to be practical and inventive. Her
mother taught her to love learning, be poised and gracious, and to
speak her mind when necessary. Going to school in El Paso taught
her to value education and time with her family. Trying to find a job
in a world where people did not hire women as lawyers taught her to
be persistent and unflinching. Her time in the Arizona Senate gave
her a sense of the strengths and weaknesses of local government. And
finally, her family gave her strength. All of these characteristics and
more can be seen in her opinions. Her free speech jurisprudence is no
exception.
III.

POSING THE QUESTIONS: THE MODERN
FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS

To understand O'Connor's impact on free speech jurisprudence, a
short, simple look at the modern free speech paradigm is helpful. The
calculus for analyzing free speech principles involves the manipulation
of three main variables: the speech, the forum, and the rule. The
speech itself makes up the threshold question. Certain categories of
speech, such as child pornography and violence advocacy, are considered unprotected speech and may be regulated by the government
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.

79. Id.

80. HUBER, supra note 35, at 59.

81. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss3/2
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under rational basis review.8 2 Commercial speech sits in between protected and unprotected speech, receiving slightly less protection than
protected speech.8 3 Most other speech is considered protected
speech.8 4 While certain types of speech, like political and religious

speech, are recognized as central to the First Amendment, the Court
has declined to use a speech value inquiry within the protected speech

category.85 If the speech at issue is protected speech, then the inquiry
moves to the forum.
In 1983, Justice White wrote an opinion in Perry v. Perry laying out
the forum variable in clear hornbook style.86 Essentially, there are
two fora: the traditional public forum and the non-traditional public

forum.87 Traditional public fora are places that throughout time immemorial have been open for public assembly and communication,
such as parks and streets.88 Speaker's Corner at Hyde Park in London
embodies the idea of a traditional public forum. 89 Every Sunday beginning in 1872, people have brought their soapboxes, both literally
and figuratively, and spoken their minds without restraint. 90 Nontraditional public fora, although still government owned, have traditionally had purposes other than communication. 9 1 Good examples of

government owned-properties that are not traditional public fora are
jails, schools, and military bases-in fact, communication may be at
odds with these fora's purposes altogether. 92 A non-traditional public
82. Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
83. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (establishing the modern commercial speech test).
84. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 (1992) (White, J., concurring in
the judgment).
85. Although the Court has not adopted Justice Stevens's hierarchy of protected
speech concept, it is still useful to note the type of speech at issue. See Young v. Am.
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 68-70 (1976) (suggesting that certain types of speech
may be of lower value and therefore not due the same protections as higher value
speech); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT
LAW 142-43 (2d ed. 2003). Political and religious speech are examples of speech that
the Court has found to be at the core of the First Amendment. See Capital Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 318 (1988). Regulations burdening these types of speech have essentially a rebuttable presumption of invalidity. Id.
86. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Justice O'Connor joined the majority in this opinion, perhaps supplying the fifth vote.
See id. at 55.
87. Id. at 45. There is also a private forum, but we will not address it here, as it is
generally not part of a traditional forum analysis.
88. Id.
89. See generally Wikipedia, Speakers' Comer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Speaker%27sCorner (last visited Jan. 24, 2010).
90. See id.
91. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
92. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (allowing the city
to ban demonstrations outside a school because the noise would be disruptive to the
classes being held there); Adderley v. Fla., 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding the arrests
of thirty-two students whose silent protest blocked the entrance to a jail).
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forum may be transformed into a traditional public forum for a limited duration or for a specific class of speakers.9 3 For example, a university can designate funds for all student organizations that wish to
publish newsletters, creating a designated or limited public forum for
all students of that university.9 4 The question of whether a public forum is traditional or non-traditional, although seemingly straightforward, can be very complex. Justice O'Connor has written opinions on
some of the trickiest forum questions the Court has seen.95
Once the forum is identified, the last question involves the nature of
the regulation at issue. Generally, regulations may be classified as
content-neutral, content-selective, or viewpoint-selective.9 6 Contentneutral regulations may incidentally burden speech, but their focus is
not on regulating expression. 9 7 For example, a content-neutral regulation would prohibit men from destroying their draft cards.9" Burning
a draft card in protest of the draft would be a regulation burdening
expression incidental to the purpose of the rule. 99 Content-neutral
regulations may also be time, place, and manner regulations-like
noise ordinances. "[A] prohibition against the use of sound trucks
emitting 'loud and raucous' noise in residential neighborhoods is permissible if it applies equally to music, political speech, and
advertising." 10 0
Content-selective and viewpoint-selective regulations seek to prevent a certain type of expression.' 0 1 A content-selective regulation
might prohibit an after-school program discussing child-rearing,
whereas in the same setting, a viewpoint-selective regulation might
10 2
prohibit discussions of child-rearing from a religious standpoint.
93. Id.; see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1982) (ruling that a
university had created a limited public forum for its students and as such could not
deny speakers access on the basis of content). This case would have been one of the
first that Justice O'Connor heard since it was submitted on October 6, 1981. She
joined the majority. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
94. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995).
95. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)
(examining a charity campaign held in federal buildings). For an in depth look at

Justice O'Connor's forum cases, see infra Part IV.
96. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 212.
97. See id. at 225.
98. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (upholding the conviction of a man who burned his draft card in protest, because the regulation furthered a

substantial government interest unrelated to speech).
99. Id.
100. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (citing
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
101. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991) (finding that the "Son of Sam" laws co-opting proceeds from
true crime books made by the criminals they feature was a content selective
regulation).
102. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(holding that the First Amendment would not allow regulations denying access to
speakers based on the speakers' points of view).
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Having addressed all three variables, the free speech analysis can begin. Manipulation of these factors produces some basic combinations

that recur with some frequency.
IV.

DEFINING THE FORUM: WHEN A SIDEWALK IS
NOT A SIDEWALK

Of the threshold questions described above, Justice O'Connor has
influenced the forum analysis the most. In her first four years on the
bench, the Court issued three of its arguably most influential forum
cases in modern First Amendment jurisprudence: Widmar, Perry and
Cornelius.1" 3 First, Widmar stands for the proposition that a nontraditional public forum may be converted to a traditional public forum for a time period and/or for a class of people.1 °4 In Perry, the
10 5
Court supplied us with a hornbook discussion of the forum analysis.
And, Cornelius fully introduced the concept that the forum need not
be a physical place. 6 Even though O'Connor was new to the bench,
she supplied the crucial fifth vote in Perry and wrote the majority
opinion in Cornelius.1 °7 At the time that Perry was decided forum
analysis was not universally used.10 8 Some members of the Court felt
that focusing on the forum issue deflected the Court from the real
questions demanded by the First Amendment. 10 9 But forum analysis
provides a logical framework for approaching otherwise tricky questions. By supplying the fifth vote in Perry, O'Connor demonstrated
both her practicality and foreshadowed her influence on the modern
forum analysis.
A.

The Contours of the TraditionalPublic Forum

"Even protected speech is not equally permissible in
all places and at all times. 11
The Supreme Court has defined traditional public fora as those
places that have traditionally been used for expression, such as streets,
103. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (defining
the reasonableness requirement for regulations in the non-public forum); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (laying out the forum analysis in hornbook style); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (explaining the concept
of the designated public forum).
104. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
234-35 (1990).
105. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
106. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
107. Id. at 790; see Perry, 460 U.S. at 38. Cornelius is singular in that the Court sat
as a seven justice panel because neither Powell nor Marshall took part in the case. So,
O'Connor's four justice majority delivers the opinion of the Court.
108. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799.
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parks, and sidewalks.1 1 1 But what about airports, jails, libraries, or
even charity drives?
1. Is the Forum the Place or the Access? Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund
One of Justice O'Connor's first forum opinions, Cornelius, is a subtle and elegant examination of the forum question. In Cornelius the
Court reviewed a charity campaign, the Combined Federal Campaign,
(CFC) run in the federal workplace.1 1 2 The question before the Court
essentially became whether the forum was the workplace or the
CFC. 3 The President created the CFC to allow nonpartisan groups
to solicit donations from federal employees in a way that minimized
disruption of the federal workplace.' 14 President Reagan later "limited participation to 'voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that provide or support direct health and welfare services to
individuals or their families.'" 1 5 Several organizations that participated in the past, but no longer fit the amended criteria for participation, filed suit alleging that the new rule abridged their First
Amendment rights to solicit funds." 6
Justice O'Connor began her analysis by affirming that noncommercial solicitation is protected speech. 11 7 Her next step was to determine
the forum. She looked at the types of access speakers had historically
requested." 8 First, she examined requests for general access to a
place, like a military base." 9 "When speakers seek general access to
public property, the forum encompasses that property."' 20 Then, she
discussed cases in which the speaker sought limited access, such as the
teachers' mail system in Perry or the advertising space on buses in
Lehman.' 2 ' Taking the analysis one step further, she pointed out that
the teachers' mail system in Perry was a non-physical point of access
to the teachers, not the mailboxes themselves. Similarly, she found
that the CFC was a means of accessing federal employees rather than
a physical presence in a federal building.' 2 2 She therefore concluded
that the forum in Cornelius was the CFC itself rather than the public
workplace. 123 The concept that the forum could be the access point
111. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
112. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 790-92.
115. Id. at 795 (quoting Exec. Order No. 12,404, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1983)).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 799.
118. See id. at 801.
119. Id. (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 804 (1976)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Justice O'Connor cited Perry for the proposition that a forum could be
intangible. Id. While it is undoubtedly true the language in Perry referred to the
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rather than the physical location of the speech came fully into being in
O'Connor's analysis of the CFC. This subtle distinction shows the
precision with which Justice O'Connor approached her forum
analyses.
Based on the type of select access historically granted to the CFC,
O'Connor classified it as a non-traditional public forum. 124 She then
considered the reasonableness of the regulation in light of the circumstances and found that it was a reasonable regulation of speech in the
non-traditional public forum. 125 Having rendered this decision, Justice O'Connor reiterated her dedication to speech-protective values
by adding that the reasonableness of the regulation could not be used
as a smoke-screen for viewpoint discrimination and suggested that the
issue could be pursued on remand. 2 6 In reaching this conclusion she
followed the forum analysis path laid down by Perry and further established herself in that school of thought. Further, she illustrated the
flexibility of the forum analysis. As time has passed, this paradigm
has
1 27
become the bedrock principle for deciding free speech issues.
2.

Is an Airport a Traditional Public Forum?

In our post-9/11 world, it defies logic that any group would argue
that an airport should be a traditional public forum. Today we readily,
though perhaps with ill grace, run the gamut of checkpoints, metal
detectors, and random searches, allowing perfect strangers to rummage through our suitcases. But, in the 1980s a friend could walk out
to your gate to bid you goodbye. Back then, airports in the United
States had a different atmosphere, and as a result, the Court faced the
question of whether an airport could be a traditional public forum.
In the first instance, the Court reviewed an airport resolution so
patently unconstitutional that hints of Justice O'Connor's sense of humor peeked through the opinion at every turn. In Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion
for a unanimous court.12 8 The absurdity of the case became clear
when Justice O'Connor phrased the issue in the case as "whether a
resolution banning all 'First Amendment activities' at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) violated the First Amendment." 1 9 To ask
the question is to answer it. The lower court struck down the resolu"school mail system" as well as the "school mail facilities" and "school mailboxes," it
is also true that the Perry court made no mention as to the physicality of the system or
boxes. Id.
124. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804.
125. Id. at 810-11.
126. Id. at 811.
127. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (analyzing a public
nudity regulation using basic forum analysis).
128. Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987).
129. Id. at 570.
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tion based on the premise that LAX was a traditional public forum. 3 °
Justice O'Connor expressly withheld ruling on whether the airport
was a traditional public forum, and decided the case on other
grounds. 3 Instead, she invalidated the resolution as substantially
overbroad.' 32 Wryly, she observed that such a rule would forbid
"talking
and reading," affecting virtually every individual who entered
13 3
LAX.

Five years later, in InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness

v. Lee, the Court finally ruled on whether an airport is a traditional
public forum. In that case, the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey banned solicitation of funds and distribution of printed or written materials within the airport terminal. 33 The majority struck down
both of those bans as unconstitutional.' 35 Justice O'Connor concurred
with the majority that the airport was not a traditional public forum.'36 She pointed out that airports were not traditional places of
expression and debate. 37 Somewhat prophetically, she observed that
airports could, in fact, be "closed to all except those that have legitimate business there."' 38 Justice O'Connor then characterized the Port
Authority as operating what was essentially a shopping mall inside of
the airport.' 39 As such, she felt that the reasonableness of the regulation should have been measured against the purposes of a "multipurpose environment" rather than a space made for air travel. 140 She
opposed the total media ban on pamphleting because the activity did
not seem incompatible with the use of the space.14 ' As a result of this
analysis, airports have remained non-traditional public fora that may
be regulated under a reasonableness test.
The question of soliciting in both the traditional public forum and
the non-traditional public forum has come before the Court many
43
times.' 42 Solicitation engenders problems of congestion and fraud.1
130. Id. at 572.
131. Id. at 573-74.
132. Id. at 577. For an explanation of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
please see infra Part IV.C. See also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 346-59.
133. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 575.
134. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1992)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in No. 91-155 and concurring in the judgment in No. 91339).

135. Id. at 685.
136. Id. at 686.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 689.
140. Id. at 692.
141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733-34 (1990).
143. Lee, 505 U.S. at 690.
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The recognition that solicitation disrupts the flow of traffic resurfaces
in one of Justice O'Connor's sidewalk cases.1 44
B.

The Sidewalk Cases

"[T]he location and purpose of a publicly owned sidewalk is
a sidewalk constitutes a
critical to determining whether such 145
public forum. ,

Within the span of one decade, the Court addressed the question of
sidewalks in four different cases, three of which were written by Justice O'Connor. 14 6 Although not all cases that define the traditional
public forum use the word "sidewalks" in addition to parks and
streets, sidewalks have long been considered public fora. 147 The problem becomes the expansion of the word sidewalk to include non-traditional public sidewalks. Are all sidewalks created equal?
1.

United States v. Grace and Boos v. Barry: Sidewalks are a
Traditional Public Forum

In 1988, the Court heard United States v. Grace, a case that hit close
to home-somewhat humorously. 1 48 Mary Grace was threatened with
arrest for being on the sidewalk surrounding the Supreme Court
building while holding a picket sign imprinted, ironically, with the text
of the First Amendment." 4 9 She left peaceably, but later filed suit
Justice White
claiming a First Amendment right to hold her sign.'
found that the sidewalk outside the courthouse was in no way distinguishable by marking or separation of any kind from any other sidewalk in Washington D.C.'5 1 He further stated that "[t]raditional
public forum property occupies a special position in terms of First
Amendment protection and will not lose its historically recognized
character for the reason that it abuts government property that has
1' 52
been dedicated to use other than as a forum for public expression.'
The sidewalk, he emphatically held, was clearly a traditional public
144. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 733-34.
145. Id. at 728-29.
146. Surprisingly, there have been other sidewalk cases too. See, e.g., Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (involving a sidewalk on a military base).
147. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 294-95. Compare Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (defining the traditional public
forum as streets and parks), with United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983)
(counting sidewalks as part of the traditional public fora).
148. See Grace, 461 U.S. at 174.
149. Id. at 174. The irony likely explains why the full text of the sign is generally
mentioned both in the case and in texts concerning the case. See also SULLIVAN &
GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 280.
150. Grace, 461 U.S. at 174.
151. Id. at 179-80.
152. Id. at 180.
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forum. 153

However, he left room for appropriate time, place, and
manner regulations of sidewalks.' 54
Five years later in Boos v. Barry, Justice O'Connor quoted Grace
1 55
and reaffirmed that sidewalks were, in fact, traditional public fora.
Grace had been so emphatic and clear on the point of Washington
D.C. sidewalks that analysis was not really necessary. 156 In Boos,
O'Connor perfunctorily held that the sidewalks outside of foreign embassies were traditional public fora and moved on to analyze whether
the regulation was content-based.' 57 The regulation forbade the picketing of foreign embassies if the signs were critical of the foreign government in question. 158 The court struck down the regulation 1as
59
impermissibly content-based in a traditional public forum.
O'Connor's opinion did little to further the analysis of sidewalks as
traditional public fora, as after Grace, analysis of a sidewalk seemed
superfluous. One month after the opinion in Boos was issued, the
Court found itself on the path to a different sidewalk-however, it
would stay the course.
2. Frisby v. Schultz: Reasonable Time, Place, and Manner
Regulations on the Sidewalk
In Frisby, a city in Wisconsin prohibited picketing "before or about
any residence" or targeted picketing. 160 Although invited to define
the streets and sidewalks of a residential community as a non-traditional public forum, Justice O'Connor declined the offer.' 6' Without
much analysis of the nature of the sidewalk, she reasserted that sidewalks in general were traditional public fora. 162 Moving on to the
next step in the inquiry, she examined the government interest and
63
held that protecting the privacy of the home was compelling.
"There is simply no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener. '' "6 Further, she found that the statute was narrowly tailored enough to allow ample avenue for the expression elsewhere.165
Rather than reclassify the forum, she relied on an analysis of the inter153. Id. The emphatic nature of his ruling was perhaps in direct proportion to the
irony of the fact pattern.
154. Id. at 183-84.
155. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988).
156. Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
157. Boos, 485 U.S. at 318.
158. Id. at 315. For more discussion of the case please see supra Part III.A.
159. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
160. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 476 (1988).
161. Id. at 480.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 485.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 483-84.
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est.' 6 6 Sidewalks, it seemed, were indisputably traditional public
fora. 6 7
3.

United States v. Kokinda: There Are Sidewalks
And Then There Are Sidewalks

No sooner had the Court established a solid line of cases consistently identifying a sidewalk as a traditional public forum, than a case
came along to knock that classification off the path. Justice O'Connor
had the unenviable task of explaining why the sidewalk at issue in this
case was not really a sidewalk for forum purposes. United States v.
Kokinda clearly demanded a common sense answer, so Justice
O'Connor drew a finer line on which sidewalks constituted the traditional public forum. O'Connor began by comparing the sidewalks in
two earlier cases: the public sidewalk outside the Supreme Court
building in Grace, and the sidewalk located on a military base in Greer
v. Spock. 6 8 In Greer the Court commented that the general characterization of streets and sidewalks as a traditional public forum did not
transform the streets and sidewalks inside a closed military base into a
traditional public forum.' 6 9 The public purpose of the sidewalk in
Grace made it a traditional public forum as opposed to the completely
70
internal purpose of the sidewalk in Greer.1
Therefore, O'Connor
reasoned, it is not the physical characteristics of the
sidewalk that de171
termine the forum, but the location and purpose.
In Kokinda, the sidewalk at issue led from the Post Office's parking
lot to its building and lay entirely on Post Office property. 1 72 This
sidewalk, O'Connor determined, was intended to facilitate business
traffic in and out of the Post Office.17 3 The regulation itself was con1 74
tent-neutral, since the Post Office prohibited all solicitation equally.
Therefore, the analysis became a reasonableness analysis in a nonpublic forum. 1 75 Thus was the sidewalk not a sidewalk, by location
and purpose.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727-29 (1990).
169. Id. at 727 (citing Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835-37 (1976)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 727-29.
172. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 722-23.
173. See id. at 727. Moreover, as will be discussed infra Part VI.B., government was
acting in its role of proprietor rather than regulator. Id. at 725. As such, its business
decisions deserved more deference. Id.
174. Id. at 736.
175. Id. at 730.
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The Internet and the Forum

"The electronic world is fundamentally different. ,176

With the rise of the Internet the courts have faced a completely new
forum. Certainly, the Internet cannot be described as having been for
time immemorial a place where people gather to express themselves;
furthermore its reach and form do not automatically make it either a
private or non-public forum.' 7 7 Moreover, the Internet recognizes no

boundaries, making it ubiquitous and amorphous at the same time.
For example, the medium presents special difficulties with regards to
pornography and children's ability to access pornography online.
The Court ended much of the forum speculation in Reno v. ACLU.
Justice Stevens distinguished the Internet from other broadcast media. 17 8 Unlike television and radio, the Internet had no long history of
regulation, or in fact, any history of regulation at all. 17 9 Additionally,
he explained that it was not invasive in nature like regular broadcast
media. 8 ' He applied strict scrutiny to the regulation at issue, and in
essence treated the Internet like a traditional public forum. 18 1 As a
result, the Communications Decency
Act (CDA) at issue in the case
1 82
failed the majority's strict scrutiny.
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, took the analogy a step further. She compared the Internet to a city, saying that rules attempting
to prevent Internet pornography from reaching children were akin to
zoning laws used in many cities. 183 Justice O'Connor's grasp of the
medium was evident in her analysis as she discussed gateway technology and cyberspace. 84 She understood that the law would like to
"segregate indecent material on the Internet into certain areas that
minors cannot access.' 1 85 However, she also understood that technology could not yet achieve that result with any precision;' 86 inevitably,
some adults would be barred from accessing materials they were constitutionally entitled to access. 187 In addition to failing the majority's
strict scrutiny, the CDA also failed the zoning test as applied by Jus176. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 889 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment in part, dissenting in part).
177. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(describing the traditional public forum).
178. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868. People choose to connect to the Internet and which
content to read.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 868-71 (1997); see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 493.
182. Reno, 521 U.S. at 888.
183. Id. at 886.
184. See id. at 891.
185. Id. at 886.
186. Id. at 891.
187. Id. at 888.
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tice O'Connor. 188 Her facile appreciation of the technology involved
illustrated her adaptability and intellectual curiosity.
A few years later, Justice O'Connor would again show her willingness to embrace new technology and the Internet in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition.'8 9 The case addressed two provisions of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 that reached beyond unprotected child pornography and into protected speech.19 ° Specifically
the Act prohibited pornography that mimicked child pornography
through the use of young-looking actors or virtual technology. 191 The
majority opinion struck down both provisions-young-looking actors
and virtual imaging-as overbroad.' 9 2
Justice O'Connor, joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, dissented from
93
the invalidation of the provision regarding virtual pornography.
The main distinction that O'Connor drew between the two provisions
was the advances in technology that would soon allow real child
pornographers to hide behind the shield of virtual child pornography. 194 The burden on law enforcement to distinguish between virtual
and real children was a serious concern to the Justice. 195 She felt that
the virtual pornography provision as worded was sufficiently narrow
because the language of the statute would allow it to reach only those
child pornographers whose virtual pornography was basically indistinguishable from the real thing.' 96 Recognizing the speed at which technology advances, she would have allowed law enforcement to address
virtual child pornography in a preemptive and logical manner.
In addition to understanding the technology involved, Justice
O'Connor foresaw the effect of the Internet on older free speech tests
as they would need to be applied in cyberspace. In her concurrence in
Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice O'Connor urged Congress to adopt "a national standard for obscenity for the Internet."' 97 The test for obscenity under Miller uses a community standard. 9 8 However, the Internet
188. Id. at 886.
189. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
190. Id. at 239-40.
191. Id. Child pornography is unprotected speech as set forth by Justice O'Connor
in the majority opinion in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
192. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258. The overbreadth doctrine invalidates those
regulations that on their face reach more protected speech than is necessary. See Bd.
of Airport Comm'ns of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).
193. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 261.

194. Id. at 263-64.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 265.
197. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
198. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). The Miller obscenity test asks (1)
if the average person using community standards finds it in total to be prurient, (2)
whether the work depicts sexual conduct as specifically defined by the state in a patently offensive way, and (3) whether the work taken as a whole lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.
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has no community as such, and to impose community standards from
a town such as Waco, Texas, on a speaker in San Francisco, California,

would present significant problems. 199 She strongly recommended
that a national standard be adopted, lest we all be held to the level of
the least tolerant community in America.2"' In this case and others,
Justice O'Connor brought to the bench the intellectual curiosity that
started in her childhood. Her willingness and ability to adapt to
change and understand new technology may be attributed in part to
that very curiosity.
V.

OPINING ON VIEWPOINT: THE REQUIREMENT OF
201
MOUNT OLYMPIAN NEUTRALITY

"[C]ontent-basedspeech restrictions are especially likely to be im202
proper attempts to value some forms of speech over others."

Deciding whether a regulation is content-neutral is one question in
which context can be a hindrance rather than a help. Often, the Justices are called upon to review rules that prevent hate speech or ordinances that affect sexually explicit businesses.2 °3 It is here where their
20 4
natural inclinations must give way to Mount Olympian neutrality.
Although Justice O'Connor has not left her imprimatur on the neutrality inquiry in the same manner as she did on the forum analysis,
her opinions in this area demonstrate both her understanding of the
state legislative process and her ability to achieve balance in the law.
She has argued that the rule of adjusting the level of scrutiny based on
whether the regulation is content-based "is a rule, in an area where
fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary and more subjective balancing tests. ' 20 5 Furthermore, she wrote that although the
results can occasionally seem unreasonable, this system is the best that
we have so far.20 6 In the end, she believed that application of the rule
has "generally led to seemingly sensible results. '2 7 Although in other
circumstances she preferred a fact-specific balancing, she recognized
that when it comes to free speech, the very neutrality of the test con199. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 587.
200. id.
201. Professor G. Sidney Buchanan, Lectures on First Amendment Law, at the
University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Tex. (Nov. 18, 2005). Professor
Buchanan describes First Amendment law as requiring Mount Olympian neutrality,
because so often the expression at issue is offensive. Judges often find themselves
protecting the rights of speech they abhor in order to protect speech as a whole.
202. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
203. See, e.g., Va. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (reviewing a regulation of hate
speech); City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (ruling on a city
ordinance preventing multiple sexually oriented businesses from sharing the same
property).
204. See Buchanan, supra note 201.
205. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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tributes to its validity.2 °s When looking at the forum, one question is
whether the government intended for the forum to be a public forum.20 9 However, the neutrality inquiry is informed not by the intent

of government, but by the effect of the rule.
A.

Motive Does Not Matter: Simon & Schuster

One of the aspects of Mount Olympian neutrality is the recognition
that content-based regulations in the public forum are automatically
suspect regardless of the reasons the law was enacted. Justice
O'Connor addressed this concept early in her tenure on the bench in
Minneapolis Star & Tribune.2 10 The state of Minnesota crafted a use
tax on paper and ink that fell disproportionately on a small group of
newspapers. 211 O'Connor held the
law unconstitutional despite the
212
good intentions of the legislature:
We need not and do not impugn the motives of the Minnesota Legislature in passing the ink and paper tax. Illicit legislative intent is
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment. We
have long recognized that even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of [free speech]
rights.21 3
Her years in the Arizona Legislature led to an understanding of the
motivations behind such legislation.2 14 However-as Justice
O'Connor's colleagues from that period in Arizona could have told
the hapless Minnesotans-regardless of their best intentions nothing
less than perfection would do.2 15
Many years later, in Simon & Schuster she would revisit this issue.2 16 In the late 1970s, the state of New York enacted what has become known as the Son of Sam law.21 7 In short, the law required that
any proceeds earned by a person convicted of a crime from the depiction of that crime must be held in escrow by the Board to pay any civil
208. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,
847 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reiterating that a fact-based balancing approach was crucial to Establishment Clause inquires).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 728-29 (1990) (finding that
whether a sidewalk was a public forum was a matter of intent and purpose).
210. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 591-92 (1983).
211. Id. at 591.
212. Id. at 591-92.
213. Id. (citations omitted).
214. HUBER, supra note 35, at 38.
215. Id.
216. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 111 (1991).
217. Id. at 111. David Berkowitz, the Son of Sam killer, was offered a lucrative
book deal, prompting the law. Id. at 108. Oddly, the law never reached Berkowitz
because his incompetence kept him from being tried and convicted. Id. at 111.
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judgments to the victims.21 8 The law was challenged when the book
about convicted "Wiseguy" Henry Hill became a bestseller and later a
Hollywood film, Goodfellas.21 9 Justice O'Connor's opinion gives us
another look not only at her careful legal analysis of the law in question, but also at her sense of humor.
Looking back from the safety of the Federal Witness Protection
Program, Henry Hill recalled: "At the age of twelve my ambition
was to be a gangster. To be a wiseguy was better than being president of the United States." Whatever one might think22of
° Hill, at the
very least it can be said that he realized his dreams.
She began the analysis of the law by explaining what a contentbased regulation was and why it should be presumptively invalid.2 2 1
Content-based regulations "impose a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech" and allow government to "drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."2 2' 2 She further explained that it did not matter whether the legislature actually intended
to suppress certain speech.2 23 Quoting an earlier case, she reiterated
that "Simon & Schuster need adduce 'no evidence of an improper
censorial motive."' 224 It was enough that the burden was placed only
on speakers whose expression contained certain content, even if the
content was unpleasant.22 5 Although she recognized the government's compelling interest in compensating the victims of crime, the
law was not narrowly tailored enough to justify its content-selective
basis. 2 2' Even in the face of a compelling interest and good legislative
intent, Justice O'Connor held firm to the level of scrutiny demanded
by content-selective regulations and the neutrality that scrutiny
requires. 227
B.

Secondary Effects and Content: City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books

In addition to protecting political expression, First Amendment
protections extend to sexually explicit expression that is not ob218. Id. at 109.
219. Id. at 112-15.
220. Id. at 112 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 115-18.
222. Id. at 115-16.
223. Id. at 117. Certainly the Board did not want to suppress the speech because it
generated funds for an escrow account allowing victims to receive some monetary
recompense for their losses. See id.
224. Id. at 117 (quoting Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 228
(1987)).
225. Id. at 116.
226. Id. at 123.
227. She would repeat her position later, saying "benign motivation, we have consistently held, is not enough to avoid the need for strict scrutiny of content-based
justifications." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 677 (1994).
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scene. 2 8 Although many businesses have tried, Justice Burger in Arcara Books forbids them from
us[ing] the First Amendment as a cloak for obviously unlawful public sexual conduct by the diaphanous device of attributing protected
expressive attributes to that conduct. First Amendment values may
22 9
not be invoked by merely linking the words "sex" and "books.
Justice O'Connor concurred with Burger that the nuisance statute in
question did not raise First Amendment issues. In Arcara, though, she
tempers Burger's position with the proviso that the government may
not use content-neutral regulations as a "pretext" to target unwanted
expression. 23 0 If that were the case, then a seemingly content-neutral
law could implicate the First Amendment. 23 ' So, although benign motivation cannot make a content-selective law neutral, base intentions
can strip a regulation of its superficial neutrality.
The Court has shown a willingness to uphold content-neutral laws
that target sexually oriented businesses, provided they do not target
the expression itself.2 32 In Renton v. Playtime Theaters, it introduced
the concept of laws aimed at the secondary effects of the presence of
sexually explicit businesses in a neighborhood.2 33 Laws addressing
secondary effects, such as the rise in crime and loss of property value,
are considered content-neutral because they "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech. '2 34 Therefore they are
regarded as content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.2 3 5
However, some commentators feel the concept of secondary effects
may become so broad as to be all encompassing. 236 Certainly all
speech has some type of secondary effect: anger, discontent, love, or
joy, to name a few. 2 37 Justice O'Connor, while upholding the secondary effects concept, has carefully defined the parameters of its scope.
In Boos v. Barry, she limited the holding in Renton.2 38
We spoke in [Renton] only of... regulations that apply to a particular category of speech because the regulatory targets happen to be
associated with that type of speech.
228. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 138-39; For a review of the Supreme
Court's test for obscenity, see the Miller test supra note 198.
229. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705 (1986).
230. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
233. Id. at 48.
234. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).
235. See id.
236. See, e.g.,

SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 146 (discussing the implications of secondary effects).
237. Professor G. Sidney Buchanan, Lectures on First Amendment Law, at the
University of Houston Law Center, Houston, Tex. (Feb. 14, 2005) (asking students
whether the concept of secondary effects was not a bit troubling).
238. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1988).
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Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience present a different situation. Listeners' reactions to speech are
not the type of "secondary effects" [to which] we referred in
Renton.

The limitation garnered only a plurality. 24 ° Later, in another plurality
decision, O'Connor further limited the scope of Renton using different
means.
Secondary effects as a concept is extremely practical and, in some
sense, carefully crafted. However, it is not entirely settled as the split
court in Cloud Books demonstrates. 241 There, Justice O'Connor faced
the question of whether Los Angeles could actually prove that multiple sexually oriented businesses in one place increased crime.242 The
argument centered around whether the city could reasonably have felt
that there was a correlation between the crime rate and the establishments based on the data they had.2 43 The city relied on a twenty-fiveyear-old study that examined, among other things, the effects of adult
establishments on property values and city crime patterns.244 Justice
O'Connor held that as long as the data was not shoddy, then the city
need not prove the efficacy of an untried solution. 245 "[M]unicipalities
must be given a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions
to address the secondary effects of the protected speech. ' 246 Justice
Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, agreed with O'Connor regarding the level of proof required.247 With Kennedy's agreement on that
issue, Justice O'Connor limited the level of proof required to a reasonableness inquiry.
The end result was that Justice O'Connor upheld the ordinance as
constitutional. She applied intermediate review scrutiny due to a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. 24s The regulation
served the substantial government interest of reducing crime, and it
left ample alternative opportunities for expression. 49 Cloud Books
limited the secondary effects doctrine to instances where the government could present enough data to demonstrate that it could have
reasonably believed the causal relationship between the adult estab239. Id.

240. Id. at 314.
241. City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (plurality
decision).

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 435-36.
Id. at 438-39.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 439.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 435-36.
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lishments and the secondary effects. ° O'Connor's efforts to retain
secondary effects as a manageable justification for regulations have
been fairly successful, if hard fought.
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion in another secondary
effects case that is worth mentioning because it provides an opportunity to view her sense of humor. In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the
secondary effects argument was used to support a city ordinance banning public nudity.25 1 The Court held that the ordinance was constitutional because it was a content-neutral regulation furthering a
substantial government interest unrelated to expression, and was no
greater than necessary. 2 The humor came in Justice O'Connor's discussion of justiciability. The owner of Pap's, a nude dancing establishment, closed his club before the case was submitted to the Supreme
25 4
In arguing
Court. 253 Justice Scalia felt that rendered the case moot.
age [of
advanced
his view, Scalia asserted that "given [Pap's owner's]
72], it seems to me that there is 'no reasonable expectation,' even if
there remains a theoretical possibility, that Pap's will resume nude
dancing operations in the future. '25 5 Justice O'Connor believed that
Pap's owner, having won his case at the appeals court level, wanted to
have the case declared moot.2 5 6 She speculated that once the case was
dismissed, Pap's owner would begin operation again. 7 As for Justice
Scalia's contention that Pap's owner was too old to re-open his nude
dancing establishment, O'Connor responded with humor. "Several
Members of this Court can attest, however, that the 'advanced age' of
Pap's owner (72) does not make it 'absolutely clear' that a life of quiet
retirement is his only reasonable expectation. '2 58 Even though she
uses humor, the statement rings true for her. Always energetic and
industrious-remember she raised three sons, ran volunteer operaher own law firm all at once-her retirement has not been
tions and
9
25

quiet.

C. Hate Speech and Content Neutral Regulations: Virginia v. Black
few if
"[W]hen a cross burning is used to intimidate,
260
any messages are more powerful. ,
250. Id.

251. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).

252. Id. at
253. Id.
254. Id. at
255. Id. at
256. Id. at
257. Id.
258. Id.

302.

302 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

303-04.
288.

259. Justice O'Connor has sat by designation with many, if not all, of the circuits.
Also, she has written articles and given speeches, especially regarding the downsides
of judicial elections. See supra Part II.B (outlining the significant number of activities
she did, and did well, all at once).
260. Va. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 357 (2003).
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Another challenge to Mount Olympian neutrality comes in the form
of regulations on unprotected speech. Even in this realm, the government may not regulate with abandon. Regulations on hate speech
have presented the Court with the question of how much content may
be regulated under the rubric of unprotected speech.
True threats, which encompass hate speech, may be found under the
penumbra of unprotected speech. 2 61 They are considered a type of
violence advocacy 262 because they "communicate a serious expression
of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. '263 In 1992, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the
Court heard a case reviewing a city ordinance prohibiting hate activities.264 The ordinance prohibited acts including cross burning that
aroused alarm in people "on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or
gender. '265 Justice Scalia issued the opinion of the Court, holding that
content-based regulations of unprotected speech would be subjected
to strict scrutiny.2 6 6 Prior to R.A.V., all regulations of unprotected
speech were reviewed under a rational basis analysis regardless of
whether the regulation was content-neutral.2 6 7 Four members of the
Court, including Justice O'Connor, concurred in the judgment only.26 8
They argued that the content of unprotected speech is precisely what
prompted the Court to declare it unprotected in the first place. As
such, content was a legitimate way to regulate those categories.2 69
The R.A.V. decision caused some confusion in the lower courts,
prompting Justice Rehnquist in Wisconsin v. Mitchell to quickly confine the holding to viewpoint-selective laws. 270 Even so, Justice
O'Connor's tact and innate sense of balance were necessary to clarify
the rule on hate speech, tidying up ambiguities left by R.A.V.

261. Id. at 359 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969)).
262. Violence advocacy includes such speech as "fighting words" and "incitement
to lawless action." See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 50-60 (outlining the
modern tests for these types of unprotected speech).
263. Id.
264. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 391.
267. Id. at 406 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Chaplinsky v. N.H.,
315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (finding that prevention and punishment of certain types
of speech presents no constitutional problem).
268. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
269. Id.
270. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 104-06 (discussing the fallout from
the R.A.V. decision). Viewpoint selective law is content-selective law that further
narrows its restrictions to a particular viewpoint. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note
85, at 305 (discussing viewpoint selectivity); see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393 (1993) (reviewing a rule allowing school
property "to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child
rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint").
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In Virginia v. Black, the Court reviewed a law prohibiting cross
burning with the intention of intimidating a person or persons. 271 Justice O'Connor began the opinion by recounting the history of cross
burning and the Ku Klux Klan.2 7 2 She concluded that while cross
burning was not automatically intended to intimidate, it was often
used very effectively for that purpose.27 3 She then discussed the areas
of unprotected speech that fall under the rubric of violence advocacy:
fighting words, incitement, and true threats.2 74 Intimidation, she concluded, was the type of expression contemplated in the true threat
category.2 7 5 As such, cross burning with intent to intimidate was unprotected by the First Amendment.2 7 6
Then she attempted the messy task of unraveling R.A. V. As clearly
as possible she explained the ruling.2 7 7 According to O'Connor,
R.A.V. stood for the proposition that unprotected speech was proscribeable based on content, provided that the proscription was based
on the same justification that originally caused the Court to label that
entire category of speech as unprotected.27 8 In other words, the state
could regulate a subset of the unprotected speech category, but not a
subset of the speech. 279 A state could prohibit fighting words as a
subset of violence advocacy, but could not prohibit fighting words offensive to women. 28" Deciding which speech would be offensive to
women would require examining the content of the speech itself and
suppressing disfavored content. 28 1 Content-selectivity would be constitutional when regulating unprotected speech as long as the regulation did not "impose special prohibitions
on those speakers who
282
express views on disfavored subjects.
Applying the now-clearer rule, Justice O'Connor found that a law
prohibiting cross burning with intent to intimidate a person or persons
was constitutional, as distinguished from the law in R.A. V., covering
only cross burning that offended people based on their race, color,
creed, or gender.2 83 While the ruling in Black still left some questions
unanswered, it was a definite improvement.
271. Va. v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347 (2003).
272. Id. at 352-57.
273. Id. at 357.
274. Id. at 359.
275. Id. at 360.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 361-62.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See id. at 362 (observing that the State could not ban "only obscenity based on
offensive political messages") (internal quotations omitted).
281. See id.
282. Id. at 361 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992)).
283. Id. at 361-62. Although the law in general passed constitutional muster, the
Court invalidated one of the provisions. Id. at 367. That provision stated that burning
a cross was prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Id. As written, it essentially
allowed the state to convict anyone based solely on the cross burning. Id. at 365.
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Several facets of Justice O'Connor's personality are quite visible in
this case. First, it is a gracious opinion. Although the R.A.V. opinion
caused some confusion, and in spite of the fact that she did not join
the R.A.V. majority, she explained R.A.V. rather than criticize it.284
She never suggested that R.A.V. was wrongly decided or poorly written.28 5 Instead, she explained the holding in clear, concise terms, casting light in a murky area.28 6 Second, her love of history is evident as
she recounts the horrible story of cross burnings and the Ku Klux
Klan.287 Her storytelling compels both fascination and sympathy from
her readers, leading them to the conclusion with her that "the burning
of a cross is a symbol of hate. '' 28 8 Finally, she demonstrated the basic
fairness for which she is known as she analyzed the regulation, applying the rule impartially without regard for the fact that the speech at
issue is ugly in the extreme.2 89 Mount Olympian neutrality finds its
place alongside context in Justice O'Connor's Virginia v. Black
opinion.
VI.

CHANGING

Focus: THE TRICKY QUESTION OF THE

GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST

The last variable in the free speech analysis is the government's interest. It is difficult to generalize about the Court's view in this area.
However, Justice O'Connor's experience as an Arizona legislator supplies the base from which she works. She is neither more nor less
lenient on government because of this experience, but brings a very
practical knowledge to her decisions.2 9 °
A.

No Possible Interest Could Justify Such a Tax:
Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota

Justice O'Connor can be a tough critic when it comes to state legislation. Her years in the Arizona legislature gave her a respect for the
states' right to legislate in their own areas.29 1 She is willing to allow
them to be creative in their attempt to fight crime, but is quick to spot
impracticalities.2 92 In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota CornSince cross burning could, in some circumstances, be an expression of something
other than intimidation, the provision was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id.

284. See id. at 361.
285. See id.

286. Id.
287. See id. at 352-57.
288. Id. at 357 (internal quotations omitted).
289. See id. at 363-68.
290. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (holding
that the city of Los Angeles could reasonably base its zoning of sexually explicit businesses on the information it had gathered).
291. HUBER, supra note 35, at 43.
292. Compare Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439 ("[Mlunicipalities must be given a
reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions.") (internal quotations omitted),

with Bd. of Airport Comm'rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569, 575 (1987) ("We
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missioner of Revenue, Justice O'Connor showed her practicality in
evaluating a special tax imposed on the press.293 Although exempt
from sales tax, publications in Minnesota were subject to a use tax on
paper and ink. 29 4 However, the first $100,000 expended for paper and
ink was exempted, leaving only the largest 11 publishers out of a total
of 388, owing taxes each calendar year.2 95 Minnesota attempted to
justify the rule by arguing that the use tax complemented the sales tax
in its function. 29 6 Justice O'Connor disagreed.2 97 First she pointed
out that the tax fell disproportionately on one segment of the press,
and as such was presumptively unconstitutional.2 9 8
Whatever the motive of the legislature in this case, we think that
recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but
also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press
presents such a potential for abuse
that no interest suggested by Min299
nesota can justify the scheme.

Then, she asked rather pointedly why Minnesota did not just impose a
sales tax on newspapers if that had been its real aim all along.3"' This
question struck right at the heart of the problem. The tax was invalidated as unconstitutional.30 '
B.

The Role of the Government and Its Interplay with Interest

The government wears many hats: proprietor, employer, and even
speaker.30 2 The role it plays with respect to the regulation being analyzed can change the weight of its interest. Justice O'Connor recognized the subtle distinctions in the hats the government wears.30 3
think it obvious that [a sweeping ban on all First Amendment activities] cannot be
justified ... because no conceivable governmental interest would justify such an absolute prohibition of speech.").
293. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 576
(1983).
294. Id. at 577-78.
295. Id. at 578. The numbers she cites are from 1974 tax documents. Id.
296. Id. at 586.
297. See id. at 586-87.
298. See id. at 585.
299. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
300. Id. at 587-88.
301. Id. at 593.
302. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (finding that government
may make a value judgment to fund programs without being obliged to fund alternatives); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (holding that when government is operating as proprietor, regulations that burden speech need only be
reasonable); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (establishing the test for government's ability to fire employees for speech).
303. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (recognizing
that government in its police role has a compelling interest in the safety of its people).
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1. Government as Educator: Pico and Mergens
In Board of Education v. Pico, the Board of Education removed a
number of books from school libraries because they were "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy."3 04 The majority held that the school board could not remove books simply because
they objected to their contents. 30 5 In her dissent, Justice O'Connor
argued the impracticality of that position when the government is acting as educator. 3 6 Essentially, when government is acting in its role
as educator it may choose the curriculum.30 7 It is the school board
and not the courts that should decide which books to keep in the library. 30 8 Government is not withholding books from students or forbidding them to read the listed books.30 9 Simply because the books
are not available in the library does not keep students from reading
and discussing those books.31 0 She concluded by saying she did not
agree personally with the decisions of the school board with regards to
the books.3 1 ' However, she noted it was not her decision but the
school board's to make.3 12 In keeping with her belief that local government can deal best with local problems, she argued that running
schools needed local governance. In this case, she further reasoned,
the school could not possibly keep every book ever written on the
library shelves so it had to make choices as to which to keep.
2.

Government as Employer: Waters v. Churchill

Another hat that government often wears is that of employer.
What are the limitations that the First Amendment puts on the government's ability to fire employees as a result of speech? Imagine
having employees that could say absolutely anything they wanted at
work with complete impunity. There must be some limits on free
speech in the government workplace. In Waters, Justice O'Connor explains that the government, in its position as employer, must have the
ability to restrain an employee who detracts from its effective
operation.3 13
The key to First Amendment analysis of government decisions,
then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one
when it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the
304.
305.
306.
307.

Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
Id.at 872.
Id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.

308. Id.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674-75 (1994).
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speech of the public at large just in the name of efficiency. But
where the government is employing someone for the very purpose
of effectively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be
appropriate.3 1 4
The case asked whether the government could fire an employee based
on what it reasonably believed she said, or whether it had to ascertain
what she actually said.31 5 To decide how much and what kind of procedure should be due the employees, Justice O'Connor examined the
differences between the government as regulator and as employer.3 1 6
One of the main distinctions is that the basic concepts of free
speech-open and robust debate, and a tolerance for opposing
views-conflict with an effective work environment.31 7 Additionally,
as employer, the government needs to be able to make broad rules,
like "do not be rude to customers. ' 318 Such a rule might fail the constitutional overbreadth test. 319 And yet, the rule must be broad to be
effective. 32 ° Finally, the legislature charges government to carry out
certain tasks in an efficient manner.3 2 1 The mission of the government
in discharging its duties as employer differs significantly from its mission as regulator.3 2 2
Justice O'Connor's explanations of the government's duties as an
employer speak of practicality and a deep understanding of what
makes the government run. Accordingly, this setting is also another
instance in which the Justice believes that a per se rule will not
work.3 23 Here, she refused to state a "general test to determine when
a procedural safeguard is required by the First Amendment. ' 324 The
test, she held, depends on the context.3 25
3.

Government as Benefactor: NEA v. Finley

One of the more controversial roles of the government arises when
it contributes money to fund projects. The National Endowment for
the Arts has provoked a significant amount of disagreement as is evident in NEA v. Finley.32 6 In Finley, a group of performance artists
argued that the advisory language in a provision of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act constituted viewpoint discrim314. Id. at 675.
315. Id. at 668.
316. Id. at 671.
317. Id. at 672. The Justice explained that debate was fine, but the employer must
be able to limit where and when at the very least. Id.
318. Id. at 672-673.
319. Id. at 673.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 674-75.
322. Id. at 675.
323. Id. at 671.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 566, 569 (1998).
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ination, rendering it constitutionally invalid on its face.32 7 Justice
O'Connor found that the provision was constitutional based on the
language of the statute itself as well as the government's role as subsidizer.3 28 Reviewing the statute, she commented that the provision was
clearly hortatory because some of the factors were not applicable to
every medium; "decency" and "respect" could hardly be considerations when judging a symphony. 329 Furthermore, she pointed out that
the provision's suggestion that the NEA take into consideration decency and respect when funding grants did not seem likely to "introduce any greater element'33 of selectivity than the determination of
'artistic excellence' itself. 1
Additionally, when government stepped into the role of subsidizer
the weight of its interest changed. Much like choosing which library
books could be on the shelf in Pico, when government chose to fund
or not to fund, its decisions were entitled to deference.3 3 1 Competitive funding does not implicate First Amendment rights like direct
regulation of speech.3 32 When government endows, it may use criteria
not permitted in its role as legislator. 333 "In doing so, the Government
has not discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; 33it4 has merely chosen
to fund one activity to the exclusion of others.
Justice O'Connor exhibits a sense of balance when the government
needs to do its job and when it needs to leave people well enough
alone. Perhaps the independence of growing up on the ranch, tempered by her days as a legislator, account for this balance. Whatever
the reason, she analyzes the government in context when weighing the
strength of its interest.
VII.

FREE SPEECH ANALYSES IN OTHER CONTEXTS

Free speech values and issues touch many areas. Many cases are a
mixture of free speech analysis and something else. Of these areas,
Justice O'Connor has been especially influential at several main
intersections.
327. Id. at 580-81. Facially challenges, as opposed to as applied challenges, always
carry a heavier burden. Id. at 580. They are considered "strong medicine" by the
Court and prevail only on a demonstration that the "provision will lead to the suppression of speech." Id.
328. Id. at 590.
329. Id. at 583.
330. Id. at 584.
331. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 921 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); accord Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (holding that government could choose
to fund speech on one side of an issue without funding the opposing view).
332. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 588 (quoting Rust, 500 U.S. at 193).
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A.

Free Speech and Attorney Advertising

"[S]pecial ethical standardsfor lawyers are properly understood as
an appropriatemeans of restraininglawyers in the exercise of the
unique power they inevitably wield in a political system like
ours. "335

Justice O'Connor has held the law and a legal career in special esteem. Even when she was the senate majority leader in Arizona, she
knew that she wanted to go back to practicing law.3 36 She has always
expected a great deal from people in the legal profession, including
herself.3 37 Her attitude toward the legal profession has left its stamp
on the crossroads of free speech and attorney ethics. When speech
intersects attorney ethics questions, Justice O'Connor has generally
recognized the state's interest in regulating attorneys.3 38
Beginning with Zauderershe set the tone for her expectations of the
legal profession and the states regulating it: lawyers shall be held to a
higher standard.3 3 9 In Zauderer, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the
majority holding that a state could not discipline an attorney for soliciting business through advice given in truthful and non-deceptive advertising.34 0 In her view, the commercial speech doctrine, allowing for
partial protection of commercial speech, called for an entirely different view of the state's interest as it applied to professional services.3 41
Professional services could not be readily evaluated by the average
layperson.3 42 The free sample concept that worked so well for products did not translate to legal services.3 43 More importantly, the attorney may slant the free advice, consciously or not, to convince the
potential client of the need for the attorney's services. 34 At this
point, she had only Justices Burger and Rehnquist in her corner.3 45
But the fight was still young.
1. The Basic Premise of Our Attorney Advertising Cases is
Wrong: Shapero, Peel, and Went For It
In her dissent in Shapero, Justice O'Connor left no doubt that she
believed the Central Hudson test for reviewing commercial speech
335. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 489 (1988) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
336. HUBER, supra note 35, at 45.
337. Id. at 46.
338. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 490 (arguing that "it is improper for any member
of this profession to regard it as a trade or occupation like any other).
339. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 676-77 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment
in part, and dissenting in part).
340. Id. at 675.
341. Id. at 677.
342. Id. at 674.
343. Id. at 673-74.
344. Id. at 674.
345. Id. at 673.
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was being misapplied.346 The Central Hudson test consists of four basic questions.34 7 It requires first that the speech concern a lawful activity and not be misleading.3 48 If the regulation passes that threshold
question, then the state may still "regulate it by laws that directly advance a substantial governmental interest and are appropriately tailored to that purpose., 349 Additionally under Central Hudson, the
regulation should be no more than necessary to serve that interest.35°
In the context of attorney advertising, O'Connor interpreted that concept to mean that the state may ban advertising that is either (1) potentially misleading; or (2) truthful, but adverse to "the substantial
government interest in promoting the high ethical standards that are
necessary in the legal profession." 35 ' O'Connor felt that the Court
was not according enough weight to the state's interest. 352 "Imbuing
the legal profession with the necessary ethical standards is a task that
involves a constant struggle with the relentless natural force of economic self-interest. 353 She felt the battle was better left to the
states.354

In Shapero, the advertisement at issue was a truthful, non-deceptive
direct mailing to people known to be facing foreclosure.355 The letter
further offered free information on how these people could keep their
homes. 356 The majority found that the regulation forbidding the letter
was more extensive than necessary.357 It felt that the few "opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes [did] not justify a total ban on that
mode of protected commercial speech. '358 Justice O'Connor was
joined by Rehnquist and Scalia in her strongly worded dissent.359 She
believed that such targeted letters had great potential for abuse.3 6 °
She equated attorney advertising to solicitation and argued that restricting both would serve the same substantial government interest.36 1 Her view, however, was still a minority on the Court.
Two years later, Justice O'Connor, joined again by Rehnquist and
Scalia in dissent, would decry the Court's "rote application" of the
346. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 486 (1988).
347. Id. at 485.
348. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
349. Id.
350. Id. Please note that this is not a least restrictive alternative test. See Fla. Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).
351. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485.
352. Id. at 487.
353. Id. at 490.
354. Id. at 487.
355. Id. at 468-69.
356. Id. at 469.
357. Id. at 475.
358. Id. at 476.
359. Id. at 480.
360. Id. at 482-83.
361. Id. at 490.
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Central Hudson test.3 6 The issue in Peel v. Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission was whether a state could ban an attorney
from printing his board certification on his letterhead.3 6 3 The State of
Illinois prohibited attorneys from holding themselves out as certified
or a specialist. 3" The Illinois Supreme Court was concerned about
confusion as to who was certifying the attorney and what that entailed.36 5 The Supreme Court majority described the regulations as
paternalistic.3 6 6 The Court held the regulations unconstitutional because they reached more speech than necessary to prevent the perceived evil.3 67
O'Connor again pointed to the misuse of the Central Hudson test in
evaluating the strength of the state's interest, and most especially the
fit required between the means and the ends.3 6 8 She felt that the state
had a substantial interest in ensuring that potential clients have all the
information they need in as unbiased a format as possible. 369 For her,
the advertising need not be actually misleading, but only potentially
misleading.3 7 ° She still had only two Justices who joined her dissent.
However, it was clear that her argument was beginning to have some
effect. Both Justice White, in a separate dissent, and Justice Marshall,
concurring in the judgment, expressed concern that the advertising
might be misleading.3 71 A shift had begun in the Court's attitude toward attorney advertising, an indication that Justice O'Connor's arguments had not been in vain.
Five years later, not only had attitudes shifted, but the personnel on
the Court had changed.3 72 Justice O'Connor now garnered five total
votes to apply Central Hudson the way she felt was correct in Florida
Bar v. Went For It.373 In Went For It, the Court examined a Florida
regulation preventing attorneys from engaging in direct mail solicitation of injured people and their families for a 30-day period after the
injury in question.37 4 O'Connor walked step by step through the Central Hudson test.37 Assuming the speech was truthful, she reviewed
362. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 119
(1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 99-100.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 98.
366. Id. at 105.
367. Id. at 97-102. The evil, as in almost all attorney advertising cases, is that the
potential client will be misled. Id. at 100.
368. Id. at 119.
369. Id. at 122.
370. Id. at 120-21.
371. Id. at 92, 111, 118.
372. Compare id. at 93 (in interim Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall
had left the Court to be replaced by Thomas, Breyer, Souter and Ginsburg), with Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 619 (1995).
373. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 619.
374. Id. at 620.
375. Id at 623-24.
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the government's interest and the fit of the rule.3 76 Citing a privacy
interest in the tranquility of the home, Justice O'Connor had "little
trouble crediting the [Florida] Bar's interest as substantial."37' 7 When
regarding the relationship of the means to the ends, Justice O'Connor
defined the fit requirement under Central Hudson as something more
than a rational basis fit, but not a least restrictive alternative inquiry.3 78 The Court upheld the regulation as a constitutional restriction on attorney solicitation under Central Hudson.37 9 Justice
O'Connor had succeeded in shaping the test, as applied to attorney
advertising, to reflect the higher level of conduct she expected from
attorneys.
2.

Electing Judges Impairs Their Ability To Be Impartial:
Republican Party v. White

No discussion of Justice O'Connor's views on attorney ethics would
be complete without a brief look at her opinions on judicial elections.
In Republican Party v. White she had an opportunity to explain the
difficulties of popularly electing an impartial judiciary. 380 The State of
Minnesota holds partisan elections for its judges.3 8' The Supreme
Court of Minnesota had a judicial cannon that prohibited judicial candidates and sitting judges from stating their views on disputed legal or
political issues.3 82 The lower court found that the state interests in
"preserving the impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the
appearance of impartiality of the state judiciary" were sufficient to
uphold the rule.3 8 3 The majority, in which Justice O'Connor joined,
found that the rule was impermissibly content-based and in violation
of the First Amendment.38 4 In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor discussed the Missouri Plan for appointing judges.3 85 She explained that
judges who are elected would never be truly impartial, because of the
pressures put on them to raise campaign money and be reelected.3 86
In her opinion, states that elect judges voluntarily opened themselves
to problems of a partial judiciary, or at least the appearance of such.38 7
376. Id.
377. Id. at 625. O'Connor cited a study done by the Florida Bar showing that people who received attorney's letters in the first 30 days after their injury, or the injury
of a loved one, regarded the legal profession as a whole on a lower level than before
the letters. Id. at 627.
378. Id. at 632.
379. Id. at 635.
380. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-93 (2002) (O'Connor,
J.,concurring).
381. Id. at 768.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 775.
384. Id. at 788.
385. Id. at 791-92.
386. Id. at 788-90.
387. Id. at 792.
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[T]he State's claim that it needs to significantly restrict judges'
speech in order to protect judicial impartiality is particularly troubling. If the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is
largely one the State brought
upon itself by continuing the practice
3 a8
of popularly electing judges.
Justice O'Connor has long considered that the judicial pool could be
significantly improved by appointing judges.3 8 9 In fact, she successfully spearheaded a drive in Arizona to amend the state constitution.39 ° She may not have directly affected the law on this point, with
the exception of Arizona, but her cogent explanation of the pitfalls of
an elected judiciary cannot help but have some impact.
B.

Free Speech and Intellectual Property

"The tension between the desire to freely exploit the full potential
of our inventive resources and the need to create an incentive to
deploy those resources is constant.,391
The intersection between First Amendment free speech rights and
intellectual property is a complicated dance. Where do copyright and
patent rights stop and free speech rights begin? In protecting a company's right to trademark a word, phrase, or symbol, have we curtailed a person's ability to express himself? The Court has achieved a
balance between these competing rights, helped in no small part by
Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence.
1.

Fact or Idea/Expression Dichotomy: Harper & Row

Justice O'Connor's opinions have done nothing less than impose "a
considered, structural approach" to copyright and patent.3 9 2 One of
her earliest opinions dealing with this dichotomy was Harper &
Row. a93 At issue in this case were excerpts from Gerald Ford's
memoirs published without his consent, prior to the release of his
book. 94 The Nation magazine-that had printed parts of his book
without permission-argued that it had a First Amendment right to
print the news, and the fact of the book itself was "news. '3 95 Nation
claimed that Section 107 of the Copyright Act, allowing fair use of an
388. Id.
389. Sainz, supra note 40, at 14 (describing a speech given by the Justice in Houston
on March 10, 2005).
390. Id.
391. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
392. William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual Property:An
Imminent ConstitutionalCollision,67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 359, 380 (1999) (discussing
the Court's demarcation of the end of Congress's power to legislate protections for
unoriginal works).
393. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
394. Id. at 542.
395. Id. at 555-56.
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author's copyrighted material, sanctioned their use of the memoirs.3 96
Additionally, Nation argued that the First Amendment allowed for a
broader vision of fair use when the copyrighted work concerned issues
of public concern.39 7

Justice O'Connor first reviewed the question of the fair use doctrine
under Section 107.398 Fair use is "a privilege in others than the owner
of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent."3 '9 9 The bundle of rights conveyed by Section
106 of the Copyright Act is subject to the fair use exception codified in
Section 107, serving the "constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts."40 She identified the right of first
publication as differing from other Section 106 rights, because logically only one person could be first.4 0 1 She further observed that history indicated that Section 107 had not been contemplated as a
defense for use of unpublished materials.40 2 She therefore held that
the unpublished nature of a work, although not dispositive,4 0would
3
generally negate the fair use doctrine as a defense for its use.
Turning to Nation's constitutional argument, O'Connor found that
the First Amendment did not widen the fair use doctrine to include
first publication rights.40 4 The constitutional requirement of free expression under the First Amendment created a fact/expression dichotomy, allowing for copyright only on expression and never facts.40 5

However, the First Amendment encompassed a concomitant right to
be free to be silent.40 6 The concept of the right of first publication
"served this countervailing First Amendment value. '40 7 As such, the
Copyright Act incorporated First Amendment values and balanced
them with the need to protect an author's creative efforts.40 8
O'Connor ruled that to allow the First Amendment right to free expression to abrogate the Copyright Act to the extent demanded by the
magazine would eviscerate the concept of copyright entirely.40 9 She
made it clear that this balance between the two must be maintained.
396. Id. at
397. Id. at
398. Id. at
399. Id. at
260 (1944)).
400. Id.
401. Id. at
402. Id. at
403. Id. at
404. Id. at
405. Id. at
406. Id. at
407. Id. at
408. Id.
409. Id. at

544.
555-56.
549.
549 (quoting H.BALL,

LAw OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY

553.
551.
554.
560.
556-57.
559.
560.
557.
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This assertion would be the bedrock principle driving a pair of decisions in the early 1990s that came as a surprise to many.41 °
2.

Curtailing Congress's Commerce Clause Sneak:
Bonito Boats and Feist.

Described as a foray into constitutional copyright structuralism,
O'Connor's opinion in Feist together with Bonito Boats drew the
boundary beyond which Congress could not go without infringing on
rights assured by the Copyright and Patent Clauses.4 11 In Bonito
Boats, Florida enacted a statute that prohibited a "direct molding process to duplicate unpatented articles"-in this case, boat hulls.41 2 The
law was challenged under the Supremacy Clause because it allegedly
conflicted with federal patent law.41 3 O'Connor and a unanimous
Court agreed.4 1 4 She reiterated the purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clauses.
[T]he ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and
technologies into the public domain through disclosure .... To a
not only
limited extent, the federal patent laws must determine
415
what is protected, but also what is free for all to use.
Once a design or technology passed into the public domain, either by
expiration of a patent, or by not being patented or patentable in the
first place, the states could not offer patent-like protection to those
designs or technologies. 4 16 Expiration of a patent, or non-patentability created a federal right to copy and use. 4 17 Although the holding
related to a state's ability, at least one commentator extrapolated it to
apply also to Congress's ability to enact laws conveying property interests in unprotected or unprotectable work.41 8 Indeed, O'Connor's
analysis of the "bargain" struck between the federal patent system
and the applicant clearly contemplates that no legislative body may
interfere with the people's right to free use after the expiration of a
patent.41 9
Adding to the limitation of patent rights articulated in Bonito Boats,
Justice O'Connor next corrected an overly broad interpretation of the
Copyright Act. Feist concerned the most extreme version of a "sweat
410. Patry, supra note 392, at 375.

411. Id.
412. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 144 (1989) (internal quotations omitted).
413. Id. at 145.
414. Id. at 168.
415. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
416. Id. at 164-65.
417. Id. at 165.
418. Patry, supra note 392, at 381 n.131.
419. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150-51.
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of brow" copyright, a telephone book.4 2 1 "Sweat of brow" is the concept that a person who assembles information in a compilation, like a
researcher, owns a copyright in the assembled form of the information.42 1 Feist's remarkable ruling held that for a work to be copyrighted, the constitution required that it must be original.42 2 Justice
O'Connor defined original as the independent work of the author
"that possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. 4 23 Minimal could be merely the originality of the arrangement of the facts.42 4
Even so, only the arrangement and not the facts themselves would be
copyrightable. 4 25 "The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first person to find and report a particular fact has not cre4 26
ated the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence.
O'Connor held that the alphabetical compilation of names and phone
numbers in a telephone book did not meet even the minimal amount
of creativity required by the constitution. 427 The fact/expression distinction is not unfair or unfortunate. 428 "The primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but 'to promote the
429 She held that the "sweat of
Progress of Science and useful Arts.' ,,
brow" doctrine was adverse to the constitutional purposes of copyright. 43 0 This reexamination of copyright surprised many commentators because the constitutional issues were not raised in the briefing,
the oral arguments, or the lower court proceedings.4 3 ' Justice
O'Connor used Feist to reset boundaries of copyright to the constitutional baseline.4 3 2 O'Connor writes in her book, The Majesty of the
Law, that "the Court occasionally starts a fire of its own. '4 33 Although she cites Brown v. Board4 of
Education as her example, per34
haps she should add Feist as well.
420. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 342 (1991) (unanimous). See also Patry, supra note 392, at 379.
421. Patry, supra note 392, at 379. With telephone books the sweat of brow copyright literally required aspiring telephone book writers to contact each and every telephone owner in the area before they could list their numbers. Id.
422. Feist, 499 U.S. at 347 (citing L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Monopolizing the
Law: The Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Law Reports and Statutory Compilations,
36 UCLA L. REV. 719, 763 n.155 (1989)).
.423. Id. at 345.
424. Id. at 348.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 347.
427. Id. at 363.
428. Id. at 350.
429. Id. at 349 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
430. Id. at 354.
431. Patry, supra note 392, at 375.
432. Id. (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright, Capitalism, and Commodification
12-13 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the George Washington Law Review)).
Professor Hamilton is one of Justice O'Connor's former law clerks. Id.
433. O'CONNOR, supra note 73, at 15.
434. Id.
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With the holdings in Feist and Bonito Boats Justice O'Connor
clearly identified two boundaries in copyright. First, only those works
that are original may be copyrighted.435 She defined original so that
compilations may only be copyrighted if their arrangement is somehow original, and then only insofar as they relate to the arrangement
itself, not the facts.43 6 Second, the constitution requires free access to

those works that are unpatented or unpatentable, either through expiration of a patent or ineligibility for a patent.4 3 7 Taken in conjunction
with her ruling regarding the fair use doctrine, Justice O'Connor's
opinions in the area of copyright and patent law have been extremely
influential.
3. Trademark: The Road Less Perilous
The balance between First Amendment free speech and trademark
values is more easily achieved. In an archetypal case, the Court examined Congress's grant of exclusive use of the word Olympic for certain commercial and promotional uses to the United States Olympic
Committee (USOC). 4 3 8 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Committee, the SFAA wanted to use the word

Olympic for a series of games modeled after the international

Olympic Games.4 39 Justice Powell held that the Amateur Sports Act

constitutionally conveyed exclusive use of the word Olympic to the
USOC.440 In its First Amendment argument, SFAA claimed that the
use of the word Olympic was political expression to which they had a
constitutional right.4 41 The Court disagreed.4 42 It held that the com-

mercial value with which the word became imbued could not be disentangled from its expressive use in this context.4 4 3 Further, the Court

stated that restricting the use of the word Olympic did not prevent

SFAA from expressing its message.44 4 Justice O'Connor concurred in
this part of the decision.44 5
435. Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
436. Id. at 350 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 547-48 (1985)).
437. Patry, supra note 392, at 380-81. Patry explains that although Bonito Boats
concerns the Supremacy Clause preempting a state's right to legislate patent-like protection for unpatented items, the case may be read to recognize a constitutional right
in the public's free access to unpatented items. Id. at 381 n.131.
438. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 524

(1987).
439. Id. at 525. The games were to be called the "Gay Olympic Games." Id.
440. Id. at 530.
441. Id. at 535.
442. Id. at 341.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 536.
445. Id. at 548. She would have allowed SFAA to argue its equal protection issue
because she believed the USOC was so entangled with the government that it had
become a state actor. Id.
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C. Free Speech and Religious Speech
"When bedrock principles collide, they test the limits of categorical
obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand Unified
44 6
Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified.

Inevitably, government's competing values of allowing freedom of
expression in its public forum and not appearing to endorse religion
come into conflict. Without reviewing Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence on the Establishment Clause, her influence in this area must be
acknowledged. As with any free speech inquiry, the threshold question is whether religious speech is protected speech.44 7 The Court has

answered affirmatively, stating that "government suppression of
speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious speech
that a free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet without
the prince. ' 44 8 The Court also answered the forum question: when
government opens a forum to a group of people, for example college
students, then it may not bar speech in that forum using content-selective means.4 49

However, the answer to the next question divides the Court. May a
public institution ban religious speech in a public or designated public
forum because to allow it would unconstitutionally endorse relig45 1
ion? 45 ° That the rule is content-selective is not in contention.
Whether that content-selectivity is mandated by the Establishment
Clause is another question entirely. Justice O'Connor strongly believes, and until now has held the Court to the proposition, that the
endorsement test is the proper inquiry at the intersection of the two
sides of the First Amendment.45 2 Furthermore, she argues the endorsement test must be an in-depth look at the history and circumstances in each case, and may not be coalesced into a bright line
rule.4 53

Her influence appears in two cases published on the same day: Capital Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette and Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia. Capital Square ad-

dressed the issue of an unattended private religious display in a public
forum.4 5 4 The city of Columbus, Ohio, allowed groups to use, upon
approval, the square adjacent to the statehouse for events, including
446. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
447. See supra Part III (discussing the types of speech that are protected).
448. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)
(Scalia, J.).
449. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981).

450. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
451. Id. at 832.
452. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 772 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
453. Id. at 778.
454. Id. at 757.
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rallies.455 At issue was the state's decision to deny requests to erect

unattended religious displays in the square.4 56 The Ku Klux Klan sued
based on free speech rights when their application was rejected.4 5 7
The Board argued that to allow such displays would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.4 5 8 The majority held that
the display did not violate the Establishment Clause.45 9

Justice Scalia proposed a new test for Establishment Clause speech
in a public forum. 46 ° "Religious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all

on equal terms."' 461 He was unable to keep a majority for his new
test.4 62 Justice O'Connor's dissent on that part of the opinion drew
Justices Souter and Breyer away from the majority, thereby preserving the endorsement test as the standard in Establishment Clause
cases. 4 63 The endorsement test requires the Court to hold a practice
unconstitutional if "the reasonable observer would view the govern-

ment practice as endorsing religion.... 464 The perception may arise
due to many factors, for all of which a case-by-case fact intensive inquiry accounts.4 65 O'Connor admitted that such a test "may not '466
always yield results with unanimous agreement at the margins.

However, the flexibility of deciding each case in context protects
against the "subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be
eroded. "467
The same day that it issued CapitalSquare, the Court issued its ruling in Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the University of Virginia.
In Rosenberger, a student group challenged a university policy reimbursing student organizations for publication printing costs. 46 8 The

University refused to reimburse this group because its publication was
455. Id. at 757-58. The groups holding rallies in the past had varied greatly, including a homosexual rights organization, the Ku Klux Klan, and the United Way. Id. at
758.
456. See id. at 758-59.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 770.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 756.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 776.
465. Id. at 778. The factors may include the history and administration of the practice, the proximity to government buildings, the treatment of similar groups' requests,
the request process, and the presence or absence of a disclaimer. Id. at 775-78.
466. Id. at 783 (quoting County of Allegany v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
467. Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
468. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23
(1995).
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religious in nature.46 9 It argued that because it was a state school, to
reimburse the group would be impermissible under the Establishment
Clause.47 ° Further, the University argued that funding an activity did
not equate to creating a forum. 47 1 The Court disagreed, stating that
censorship of publications violated a vital principle of the First
Amendment.4 72 It found the University had indeed created a limited
public forum for use by its students. 4 73 Having defined the forum the
Court then reviewed the regulation under an Establishment Clause
inquiry. Using the fact specific endorsement test that O'Connor championed in CapitalSquare,47 4 it held that the Establishment Clause did
not justify withholding funding based on viewpoint-selective critethe University's
ria. 475 "There is no Establishment Clause violation in
476
honoring its duties under the Free Speech Clause.
In concurrence, Justice O'Connor commented acerbically on attempts to fit the endorsement test into a per se rule.47 7 This time she
chastised the other side of the bench for its dogmatic adherence to the
idea that public funds can never finance religion.4 78
Reliance on categorical platitudes is unavailing. Resolution instead
depends on the hard task of judging-sifting through the details and
determining whether the challenged program offends the Establishment Clause. Such judgment requires courts to draw lines, sometimes quite fine, based on the particular facts of each case.
[E]xperience proves that the Establishment Clause, like the Free
Speech Clause, cannot easily be reduced to a single test.4 79
Justice O'Connor, in her years on the bench, has maintained the endorsement test as standard for cases at the crossroads between speech
and religion.480 With her retirement, it remains to be seen whether
the new Court will continue "the hard task of judging" in this area.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Free speech strikes near and dear to the heart of every American.
The founders made it the very first amendment. Free speech has a
champion to keep it unbowed, if not unbloodied. Justice O'Connor
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 822-23.
at 827-29.
at 835.
at
at
at
at

830.
837-44.
845.
846.

477. Id. at 847.
478. Id. at 846-47.
479. Id. at 847, 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

480. See

SULLIVAN

& GUNTHER, supra note 85, at 563 (citing O'Connor's endorse-

ment analysis as the "general approach to establishment clause adjudication").
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has fought well in its cause. She helped create and define the backbone upon which the forum analysis of free speech rights depends.
Under her influence, the practical fact-based approach has become
the standard for the areas in which it is needed. Her legislative experience has been invaluable in assessing the government's interest from
an understanding, but exacting point of view.
The character instilled in O'Connor by growing up on the Lazy B is
apparent in the qualities she brings to the bench. She is practical, industrious, intellectually curious, inventive, and warm. Her father
would be proud, even if he would have expected no less. Her poise
and keen wit bring a graciousness to her writing that strikes the right
balance between accessible and intellectual. She is greatly missed on
the Court, but her influence will be there for many decades to come.
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